In this article I analyse differences in the legitimation strategies used by, and on behalf of the two presidential candidates in the elections of December 2004 in Romania, using a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis and pragma-dialectics. These differences are seen to lie primarily in the varieties of populist discourse that were drawn upon in the construction of legitimizing arguments for both candidates: a paternalist type vs. a radical, anti-political type of populism. I relate the success of the latter type to more effective strategic maneuvering in argumentation, part of more effective branding strategies in general, but also to existing types of political culture amongst the electorate and to social, economic circumstances. In CDA terms, I discuss the "Băsescu brand" as involving choices at the level of discourse, genre and style; in pragma-dialectical terms, I view its success as partly the effect of successful strategic maneuvering (and of choices at the level of topic, means of adaptation to the audience and presentational devices). I also place the success of this brand within the Romanian context at the end of 2004, where often questionable populist electoral messages were perceived as reasonable and acceptable, as fitting adjustments to the situation and even as means of optimizing the deliberative situation of the electorate.
Introduction
In recent research I have analysed various aspects of "transition" in post-communist Romania , 2006a , 2006b , 2006c and this paper is a contribution to this line of work, with a focus on electoral discourse in the 2004 presidential campaign.
1 Methodologically, the paper combines Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1989 , 1992 , 2000 , 2003 , 2006 , Wodak et al. 1999 with a particular theory of argumentation, pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992 , van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002 , an approach which I started developing in Ieţcu ( , 2006a .
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One of my particular concerns here is with aspects of "political marketing" (Newman 1999 3
Theoretical framework

Branding
One innovative element in the 2004 election was the application of the strategy of "branding" in Băsescu's campaign. In an interview shortly after the elections, GMP Advertising director Felix Tătaru, who was responsible for the campaign, claimed that
Băsescu was the first Romanian politician to be treated as a "brand". The branding strategies that were used to construct Băsescu as a politician involved cutting across boundaries which conventionally separated the field of politics from the fields of popular entertainment, commercial advertising and from everyday life, through an interdiscursive hybridity (Fairclough 1992 (Fairclough , 2003 (Fairclough , 2006 which articulated together a wider range of communicative resources than were normally found in Romanian politics. The campaign for the re-election of Băsescu as Mayor of Bucharest earlier in 2004, for example, had the character of a humorous commercial advertising campaign in which Băsescu was symbolized as a red chilli pepper (ardei iute), a symbol which evoked his tendency to flare up at unpredictable moments, suggested that he adds spice to Romanian politics, that he is fast and efficient, that his presence is inconvenient and irritating to the political establishment, etc. (Fairclough 2006: 101-105) .
In most electoral materials, Băsescu addressed his electorate directly, often in highly colloquial language. On the whole, he emerged primarily as an open, straightforward man, with a keen sense of humour, an essentially "outlaw" character calling on the electorate to support him against the corrupt power system. This persona was very much akin to the comic characters of traditional folk-tales: the subversive peasant anti-hero, who, through the power of his own wit and cunning, succeeds in humiliating and punishing the greedy and dishonest rich. The distance Băsescu took from more conventional, formal political styles, in his manner of talking and public behaviour, as a fundamental element of the "Băsescu brand", was of a piece with the more general radical, anti-political variety of populism of his campaign and resonated well with the anti-political feelings of the Romanian electorate, with the prevailing orientations towards the political system of large segments of the electorate. As I will argue below, Băsescu's success was partly ensured by the way in which, in his manner 4 of talking, in his behaviour, he seemed to embody or enact the (moral-political) values of the brand that was created for him: primarily justice (punishing the corrupt political system), honesty, an anti-elitism and radicalism directed at the entire political class, a feeling of solidarity with the population along a clearly defined "us" vs. "them" dividing line.
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Populism
The 2004 election reconfirmed the electorate's affinity for a "radical" form of populism, directed against the entire political class, i.e. for a fundamentally "antipolitical" form of protest (Mungiu-Pippidi 2002) , but also for other varieties of populist message, most notably for a paternalist message of stability, continuity and social consensus.
In the tradition inaugurated by Ionescu and Gellner (1969) , there are several distinct ways of understanding populism: as an ideology, a pseudo-ideology, a political movement, a political style, a set of attitudes, etc. A widespread view is that populism
is not an ideology in its own right, but a "syndrome" (Wiles 1969 ), a "meta-doctrine", a "recurrent ideological structure of a very general type that can be parasitic on other more clearly defined doctrines and push them towards eccentric positions" (Ioniţă 1998: 198) . Populism is also often viewed as a pathology of western democracy, a corrupt form of democratic ideas, and therefore a threat to a liberal-democratic society. Mudde (2004) rejects the "pathology" thesis and argues that populism has now become mainstream in the politics of western democracies, that there is and will be a prevailing "populist Zeitgeist". For Mudde, populism is an ideology, namely, "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the "pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people". (Mudde 2004: 543-544 ). Jagers and Walgrave (2005) reject the ideology view of populism and suggest instead that populism is a "political communication style", or a communication "master frame", a way of talking about a variety of issues by appealing to and identifying with the people and pretending to speak in their name. As a political style 5 which merely makes reference to the people and their problems in this way (a "thin" conception), populism has no particular political colour, it can be either left-wing or right-wing. It is primarily a "conspicuous exhibition of closeness to (ordinary) citizens", achieved both by talking to the public in a certain manner and by a certain content of discourse, i.e. by talking about the people, and thus showing care and concern for their problems. A "thick" conception involves two additional features: (a) populism gives expression to anti-establishment, anti-elite feelings, and (b) is based on a particular homogeneity/ exclusion logic (Jagers and Walgrave 2005: 3) .
Whatever view they take, most theorists seem to agree that some form of dichotomy, e.g. between "the people" and the corrupt economic or political "elite" or "oligarchy", or between "the people" and some "enemy" or other, is a minimal characteristic of all varieties of populism. Băsescu's populism drew very clearly on the dichotomy between the "people" and the ex-communist political and economic oligarchy in order to put forward a radical political message.
The argumentum ad populum as fallacy and rhetorical ploy
Populism correlates most obviously with the fallacy of the argumentum ad populum, broadly defined as an unjustified appeal to popular sentiment or opinion. The argumentum ad populum may function as a "rhetorical ploy" or as a fallacious argument (Bowell and Kemp 2002) . In the former case, it will involve a purely emotional (non-argumentative) appeal to the audience's feelings and social instincts; in the latter case, it will involve a fallacious appeal to premises that ought not to persuade anyone (appeals to majority belief or to common practice). In the case of this fallacy, the premise that makes the argument valid, i.e. "Any belief shared by a majority of the people is true", by being false, also makes it unsound.
In pragma-dialectics, the argumentum ad populum (the populistic fallacy) is a variant of the argumentum ad verecundiam (argument from authority): the authority of a body of people is invoked in support of a standpoint. As a fallacious argument, the argumentum ad populum is a violation of Rule 7 (the argument scheme rule) at the argumentation stage, i.e. an instance of using an inappropriate argument scheme 6 (symptomatic argumentation) by presenting the standpoint as being right or true because everybody (most people) think it is right or true. As a rhetorical ploy or appeal to emotions, the argumentum ad populum is dealt with in pragma-dialectics as a violation of Rule 4 at the argumentation stage (the relevance rule). It is a fallacy in choosing the means of defence: the standpoint is defended by non-argumentative means, by playing on the emotions and prejudices of an audience (a fallacy of pathos) (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 132-135) .
Analysis: The final debate between candidates
The final televised debate of the second round of the presidential campaign (the show Destinaţia Cotroceni), hosted by the national channel TVR1 on December 8, 2004, included a widely commented on moment of "sincerity" or "confession", in which
Traian Băsescu raised the issue that both himself and Adrian Năstase had been, after all, "communists" before 1989. While the emergence of the topic as such was probably not as unpremeditated as it seemed to be, the way in which Băsescu developed it was an excellent illustration of the more general type of interaction with the electorate that he engaged in during the campaign, of the types of strategic maneuvering he pursued in argumentation, and of the strategies of political marketing and branding that were successfully employed on his behalf.
Strategic maneuvering in the "two communists" episode: the Băsescu brand in action
Here is an extract from the "two communists" episode (my translation from my own Năstase: …. about who you were supporting when you were in Anvers, if you want we can talk about these details.
Băsescu: We can talk about it. In Anvers I was serving my country.
Năstase: You mentioned a problem that we have. Let's see what the problem is.
Băsescu: Yes we have a problem. Do you know what the big problem is?
Năstase: The mirror.
Băsescu: No, this was just a question I was asking myself. But the big problem that we two have is not just that we were both party members. Maybe after all it's not such a shameful evil thing to be a party member in a communist state. This is what the state was like at the time. The drama is that we can't stay with the same mentalities 15 years after communism in Romania. And you convince me every day that you are not capable of understanding that these institutions have to function by themselves. (…)
The "confession" moment is relevant for a certain type of criticism aimed at contemporary politicians: instead of substantive debate on matters of policy, they offer 8 themselves, as personalities; instead of public deliberation they exploit the attractions of the intimate, private sphere. Thus, discourses and arguments grounded in the private sphere are eroding the domain of public sphere debate, masquerading as deliberation (Goodnight 1982: 206) . A crucial part of the success of Tony Blair's style, for instance, was seen to lie in his capacity to 'anchor' the public politician in the 'normal person', to combine formality and informality, publicness and privateness, ceremony and feeling (Fairclough 2000) , and the success of that highly personal style (itself part of the "Blair brand") often helped to legitimize or obscure various controversial matters of policy.
In the extract above, a variety of choices in terms of discourse, genre and style made their own contribution to the overall success of Băsescu's (self-)legitimation strategies and to the consolidation of the "Băsescu brand". In particular, his choice to frame the argument as an alleged intimate conversation with himself in front of the mirror, to draw on narratives of personal experience and on the colloquial register, together with his improvised manner of talking, created a highly reflexive, expressive type of political discourse, which was apparently converted by the audience into moral qualities of honesty, sincerity, authenticity.
Băsescu's manner of speaking is markedly colloquial in this extract. In and only corrects back to "Mr. Năstase" towards the end of the confrontation. He is being characteristically populist here in terms of style, not only because he exhibits a particularly close relationship with the audience and with his interlocutor and shows concern for people's problems, but also because he deliberately suspends the normal rules of the political game he is involved in and, in a typically populist, anti-political manner, engages in man-to-man, informal conversation on an apparently highly personal (and apparently non-political) issue. Throughout the extract, Băsescu is not fully coherent, his speech is halting, he gives the impression of searching for the right word without always finding it, and his body language and facial expression are consistent with these hesitations. He comes across as an authentic personality, a man 9 speaking from the heart in an unprepared way, who is not trying to assume an identity or style that does not come naturally to him. He was also perceived at the time as a man who is honest enough to have doubts about himself and to "confess" them in a public context (see also Fairclough 2006: 104-105) . By contrast, Năstase's more elegant, fluent style, his more abstract language were rejected as "arrogant" and perceived to be closest to the "wooden" language of communism, i.e. as language without a concrete referent, ultimately a form of deception.
On the whole, as I am arguing further on, the "Băsescu brand" drew on a variety of populist resources, at the level of discourse (topical choices, e.g. the Romanian people as victim, the "us" vs. "them" dichotomy -see below), genre (e.g.
narratives of personal experience) and style (register, body language, display of emotions, etc.). It is also part of the argument I am developing here that Băsescu's argumentative success was to a large extent due to the particular way in which these resources were embedded in a coherent argumentative and political legitimation strategy, that benefited from effective "strategic maneuvering" (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser 2002) and thus successfully and coherently expressed the "Băsescu brand".
Băsescu thus seemed to "embody" the moral-political values he claimed to stand for, and to naturally "inhabit" the brand that was constructed for him.
In pragma-dialectics, strategic maneuvering is defined as the process whereby arguers try to maintain a balance between their so-called "rhetorical" and "dialectical"
objectives. People engaged in argumentative discussion are viewed as oriented simultaneously towards concluding their differences of opinion their way (thus winning the argument) but also towards reaching this conclusion in a reasonable way, i.e. by adhering to a set of norms that define reasonable argumentation practice (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002) . It is, in my view, part of the distinctiveness and success of the "Băsescu brand" and of Băsescu as a politician that this balance between potentially conflicting aims was effectively managed and maintained: Băsescu succeeded in persuading his audience and at the same time did not appear to disregard a commitment to reasonableness. This was evident in the choices that he made (or were made on his behalf) in terms of all the three aspects that pragma-dialectics discusses in connection with strategic maneuvering: topical choices (e.g. what to discuss, what to leave out), adaptation to the audience (e.g. how to create empathy), presentational devices.
In the extract above, effective strategic maneuvering is primarily evident in the way Băsescu chooses to address the topic of communism and thus to create a confrontation that he will turn to his advantage. In pragma-dialectical terms, the interaction between the two participants involves four stages. At the confrontation stage, Băsescu voices his view (standpoint) that "we both have a big problem" and launches an invitation to his opponent to "discuss it openly". At the opening stage, both participants seem to agree that there are more problems than one, yet both allow the discussion to focus on the problem that Băsescu has decided to raise. Băsescu then proceeds by defining the problem (and the confrontation) in terms of a "curse" on the Băsescu's strategic maneuvering is particularly effective here because it draws on a distinction which an important segment of the electorate most certainly liked to see being made, i.e. between being a party member nominally (which a lot of people have been) and having communist attitudes and behaviour that are incompatible with democracy. He thus cleverly opts out of a Manichean opposition between "us" and "them" as "anti-communists" vs. "ex-communists" and draws the dividing line elsewhere, i.e. between the majority of the population (in which he includes himself) and the ex-communist oligarchy.
Strategic maneuvering is also effective in positioning Băsescu as not being all that different from or better than other Romanians, while still being a "communist with a difference". Such self-critical emphases are likely to increase the dialectical acceptability of the argument. They are cleverly balanced by a rhetoric which subtly flatters the electorate and invests it with the power to grant Băsescu a sort of symbolic clemency. Băsescu chooses here a position of moral inferiority: it is a "curse on the Romanian people", he claims, that they should have to choose him; still, as far as bad choices go, Băsescu constructs himself as the lesser evil, by comparison with Năstase.
He is therefore at once constructing a victim role for the electorate, giving the electorate the moral high ground, and portraying himself as someone who understands the situation and is full of compassion ("on my honour, I was sorry for it"). All of these are powerful forms of ad populum appeal, part of the stock-in-trade of populist leaders everywhere.
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Năstase is more restrained, polite ("if you will allow me…") and uses indirectness more. Surprisingly, he allows Băsescu to get away with various forms of obstructing critical discussion, among which the most glaring is the way in which he ends up denying his own original standpoint and its associated starting point. From:
"we both have a problem", i.e. "we have both been communists", he is allowed to conclude that Năstase has a problem, that Năstase is a communist, in the sense of having a communist mentality, while he himself is not. In so doing, he is arguably violating Rule 6: he is denying a premise representing an accepted starting point.
However, his repeated acknowledgement that he is a communist (albeit, as it turns out, in a different sense), allows this violation to go more or less unnoticed. He is also allowed to get away with blatantly weak or irrelevant arguments in support of the claim that he himself is not a communist properly speaking, e.g. because "I have looked at myself in the mirror". Such argumentative support can be discussed in relation to pragma-dialectical Rule 2, as a violation of the obligation-to-defend rule by presenting a standpoint as beyond doubt or self-evident (evidence from introspection is here allegedly self-evident and beyond doubt).
Băsescu's argumentative success in this debate is due primarily to his choice of the "two communists" topic, and his effective way of handling it. Not only does he repeatedly redefine the confrontation in his favour, but he also chooses a starting point that will serve his own interests best, while at the same time appearing to be operating with a starting point that is accepted both by himself and his interlocutor. More exactly, while appearing to advance the statement "we have both been communists" as a mutual concession or as an intersubjectively accepted starting point, he is in fact unobtrusively introducing a distinction between two different understandings of what a "communist" is and he actually ends up denying that himself and Năstase have been to the extent that implicit premises that refer to certain attitudes displayed towards "the people" are taken as conclusive and sufficient "signs" that a certain presidential candidate is the right choice (violations of Rule 7). In arguments such as these, strategic maneuvering gets derailed, strictly speaking, although, as I will argue below, the fact that it does is not necessarily obvious, or if obvious, not necessarily unacceptable, to the participants involved.
One of the reasons for the above-mentioned fact could be that, while steering the confrontation in his favour, Băsescu appeared at the same time to be driven by a sincere concern to clarify the matter under discussion, to examine it from all possible perspectives, and by an honest desire to get at the truth, however uncomfortable for himself that truth might be. He thus appeared willing to lay himself open to public scrutiny, without trying to hide anything about his past, and at the same time did not damage his credibility by making strong explicit statements about how different he was from Năstase. The balance between "rhetorical" and "dialectical" objectives thus seemed to be masterfully maintained, or, in other words, Băsescu apparently managed to uphold a commitment to a critical ideal of reasonableness, while at the same time successfully pursuing his persuasive aims. The fallacious moves that took place did not therefore succeed in damaging the overall impression that Băsescu was arguing reasonably in the context in which he found himself, by adjusting optimally to the situation and the audience, and upholding a commitment to reasonableness. 4 Moreover, given the overarching political goal of ousting Năstase and the PSD from power by whatever means available, Băsescu's populist style and discourse were welcomed, by large segments of the electorate, but, most significantly, by the anticommunist, liberal-democratic intellectual elites, as well-adapted to the situation in Romania. Paradoxically, ad populum fallacies and other examples of fallacious strategic maneuvering were often perceived by otherwise highly critical people as reasonable contributions to the electoral campaign and effective means of persuading and mobilizing the electorate.
Legitimation and strategic maneuvering in the "supporters" video-clips
In this section I will continue to look at differences in the strategies of legitimation In marketing, in general, products can be advertised through "endorsement" by famous personalities. In electoral campaigns, the campaign staff and other supporters form a "symbolic entourage" meant to give credibility to a candidate.
Argumentatively, this can correlate with appeals to authority (the symbolic authority of cultural personalities, politicians) and ad populum appeals (to popularity, or to the feelings, emotions, enthusiasms of the audience).
Marketing research is generally used to identify and anticipate the wants and needs of the public, and political marketing involves an identification of the wants and needs of voters (citizens). The "product" it develops is a manufactured image based on adapting the candidate's political platform, ideology, values, personal qualities, record of achievements, etc. to these alleged wants and needs. The political marketing undertaken in support of the two candidates seems to correlate here with a problemsolution argumentative topos, in which voting for one or another candidate is presented as a "solution" to people's "problems".
I am drawing here on a view of argumentation on normative matters which regards ought-claims ("we ought to vote for x") as being made on the basis of at least two types of premises, which define (a) the (allegedly) factual circumstances (i.e. the problems people have, as well as the candidate's qualities and areas of competence) (b) a normative ideal in view of which the ought-claim is made (Kratzer 1991) . Such arguments seem to have the following form: given people's problems, as well as the candidate's ability to satisfy them (circumstantial premises), given what people want, i.e. that problems should bee solved (normative premise), and given that, if people want their problems solved, they should vote for that candidate (warrant), it follows that it is necessary/ recommended that people vote for that candidate (claim). I am interested in differences between the two campaigns in terms of what problems were recognized and attributed to the public (in circumstantial premises) and what problems were obscured, of how the problems that were recognized were related to the images that were manufactured for the candidates and to the particular qualities and abilities that were emphasized, and in terms of what normative ideals (what aims, needs or wishes) were invoked on behalf of the people (in normative premises).
A striking difference between the two video-clips is that while Băsescu's supporters were public personalities, most of Năstase's were peasants. Năstase's campaign makers obviously acted on the fundamental premise that in a country with over 40% rural population, a presidential candidate can only win by effectively mobilizing the rural vote. Năstase is described in the video-clip as "competent" (he has "training", "culture", "moral rectitude", "experience", he is a "good politician" and a "good leader", etc.), he was also repeatedly associated with Romania's European "future". On this basis, his supporters legitimized the claim that people should vote for him. Many superlatives were used: he is "the best", he is "very, very good", "the only one" who can do various things. It was however the purely emotional arguments (often verging on the irrational) that were really noticeable in Năstase's "supporters" clip, e.g.
in the intervention of a peasant woman shown holding Năstase's portrait to her chest and saying: "I don't want anybody but Mr. Năstase. I don't need a pension, I don't need anything, I only want to see him and talk to him… Adrian Năstase… my own soul", or of another peasant woman saying: "He has a beauty, he has a power bestowed on him by God to lead the people".
Arguments based heavily on ad populum and emotional appeal were used to construct the image of a paternalist and almost messianic leader, loved and worshipped by a pre-modern, parochial and infantilized population in exchange for care and protection. Năstase's appeal in the "rural" sequences of the video-clip was primarily of a charismatic type, his presence seemed to create a state of grace in which all needs other than emotional ones were suspended. The legitimizing argument in support of Năstase had the following form: given (1) Băsescu's campaign, by contrast, was mainly oriented towards the urban population and especially towards relatively young, educated voters, hence the humorous, playful tone of the campaign and the wide use of intertextuality and parody.
Băsescu's supporters in the video-clip were not anonymous peasants, they were either well-known public personalities or faces that people would have recognized from the leaflets that were used in the campaign. Instead of argumentation ad populum based on the authority of an anonymous collective body of people, there was rather an argument from the authority of specific individuals. Or, to be more exact, an argument from authority involving well-known personalities was combined with a modified version of an argumentum ad populum, based on a claim to representativeness of a set of ordinary people. Among the most interesting elements of strategic maneuvering was the achievements and issues of symbolic representation gave the strange impression that these, not the economic situation, were the major issues of concern for the population.
To the extent that a whole range of real problems were obscured and a whole range of potential differences of opinion were not brought into the open, the overall strategy was open to the charge of fallaciousness, seen as obstruction of reasonable discussion or derailment from critical conduct.
On the whole, while Năstase emerged as a paternalist leader in terms of social stability and consensus, Băsescu was constructed as a providential leader and saviour of his nation in times of crisis. By drawing excessively on a paternalist type of populism and disregarding corruption and poverty issues, Năstase's campaign achieved a relatively poor adaptation to audience demand. Băsescu's radical, authoritarian message, on the other hand, showed considerable sensitivity to the concerns of the electorate, not least of all by claiming that there were radical and quick solutions for them. Better adaptation to audience expectations, better use of presentational devices (notably, the use of humour, of the colloquial register, etc.) and more relevant topical choices (i.e., corruption, not foreign policy), as elements of successful strategic maneuvering, all contributed to the success of the "Băsescu brand"
and to its electoral success in the campaign. The context of perceived acute crisis in Romania also played a crucial part. It was in part due to contextual factors that a variety of argumentative moves that might have otherwise been perceived as questionable tended to go unnoticed or to be perceived as reasonable, as being welladjusted to the demands of the Romanian context.
Differences between argumentation strategies in the "supporters" video-clips can also be taken to indicate different assessments of the "political culture" (Almond and Verba 1963/1996) of the Romanian population by political advisors and campaign staff. Năstase's electoral message seemed to be predominantly intended for an 20 electorate that shared a "parochial" type of political culture. The "subject" type was addressed in terms of a promise to continue the gradual measures aimed at relieving poverty, by Năstase, and by a pledge, by Băsescu, to "crush" the corrupt political system that was responsible for poverty. Băsescu's campaign showed better adaptation to a wider variety of segments of the electorate and types of political culture. This included a "participant" type of political culture, i.e. a segment of the electorate who did not necessarily share a strong commitment to liberal-democratic values but who in the end voted for Băsescu on the strength of his radicalism and authoritarianism, as well as a radicalized liberal-democratic segment, who voted for Băsescu either out of conviction or for primarily pragmatic reasons, hoping for radical change in the spirit of liberal democracy. This latter type of voters, in principle critical of and not easily swayed by populistic appeals, suspended their critical stance and supported Băsescu's campaign as one which served a perceived "reasonable" and "constructive" purpose in the context it was meant address: a situation of crisis, a predominantly parochial and dependent electorate with inertial political options. This would explain why Băsescu was also massively supported by the intellectuals, who did not seem to mind Băsescu's frequent "derailments" from critical conduct, but chose to back him unconditionally given the overall political goals he embodied.
Conclusion
My analysis has suggested that one candidate in the Romanian presidential election, Traian Băsescu, was able to gain a small but decisive electoral advantage from a campaign which appropriated and implemented strategies for political marketing in a more sophisticated and effective way than the campaign of his main opponent, as well as using a strategy for political branding. I have partly related the success of the "Băsescu brand" to more effective strategic maneuvering in argumentation: the choices that were made in terms of what issues to address, how to address them, how to best adapt to audience demand (all drawing on certain varieties of populism), but also the way in which a commitment to reasonableness and to the norms of critical discussion was effectively maintained, all contributed to strengthening and expressing the brand and the values Băsescu claimed to stand for. It is partly thanks to effective strategic maneuvering that Băsescu emerged as credibly and coherently embodying these values. I have also related Basescu's electoral success to factors having to do with the Romanian political and economic context at the time of the elections, a situation of perceived crisis, and to features of the political culture of the electorate. Finally, I have suggested that argumentative moves which, in other circumstances or for other audiences, might have been considered at least questionable, if not downright fallacious, were not necessarily perceived as such by significant sections of the electorate, or, if they were, the fact was not necessarily relevant in terms of voting behaviour. Basescu's populist style, the populist legitimation strategies deployed on his behalf were, rather, considered to be reasonable and effective adaptations to the context, to the Romanian electorate and to the overall political goals that he embodied.
